[1] - Levy, N. (2014) Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. And see Caruso, G.D. (2015b) “If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, then People are Less Responsible than We Think,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7–8): 49–60.
[1] - Caruso, G.D., and Mo rris, S.G. (2016) “Compatibilism and Retributive Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance,” Erkenntnis 81: and see Feinberg, J. (1970) “Justice and Personal Desert,” in his Doing and Deserving, Princeton: Princeton University Press.and see Pereboom, D. (2001) Living Without Free Will, Oxford: Cambridge University Press.and see alsoe Strawson, G. (1994) “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 75: 5–24.
[1] - د.رءوف عبيد، في التسيير والتخيير بين الفلسفة العامة وفلسفة القانون، مجلة العلوم القانونية والاقتصادية، العدد الثاني، السنة الحادية عشرة، جامعة عين شمس، مصر، ١٩٦٩، ص 109
[1] - توماس بينک، الإرادة الحرة ترجمة/ ياسر حسن، مراجعة/ ضياء ورّاد، الطبعة الأولى، مؤسسة هنداوي للتعليم والثقافة، القاهرة، ٢٠١٥، ص ٣١
[1] - د.حسن علي ذنو، فلسفة القانون، الطبعة الأولى، مطبعة العاني، بغداد، ١٩٧٥، ص ٢١٧
[1] - Pereboom, D. (2001) Living Without Free Will, Oxford: Cambridge University Press. And Pereboom, D. (2014) Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.and see Caruso, G.D. (2012) Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
[1] - Levy, N. (2011) Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press.
[1] - Strawson, G. (1986) Freedom and Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press [revised edition 2010]. And see Strawson, G. (1994) “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 75: 5–24.
[1] - توماس بينک، الإرادة الحرة ترجمة / ياسر حسن، مراجعة/ ضياء ورّاد، الطبعة الأولى ,ص 21
[1] - هو الفيلسوف النمساوي کارل بوبر(1902- 1994) د.عبد الله محراش، الحرية والحتمية، دروس الفلسفة، منشورة على الإنترنت على الموقع :
http://cdhsos.yoo7.com/t76-topic
[1] - Libet, B., Gleason, C.A., Wright, E. W., and Pearl, D. K. (1983) “Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act,” Brain 106: 623–642.
[1] - Baumeister, R.F. (2008) “Free Will in Scientific Psychology,” Perspectives of Psychological Science 3: 17
[1] - Nadelhoffer, T. (2011) “The Threat of Shrinking Agency and Free Will Disillusionism,” in L. Nadel and W. Sinnott-Armstrong eds. Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet, New York: Oxford University Press.
[1] - King, M., and Carruthers, P. (2012) “Moral Responsibility and Consciousness,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 9: 200–228.
[1] - Smith, A. (2008) “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment,” Philosophical Studies 138: 367–392.
[1] - Arplay, N., and T. Schroeder. (1999) “Praise, Blame and the Whole Self,” Philosophical Studies 93: 161–199.
[1] - Smith, A. (2005) “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115: 236–271.
[1] - Yaffe, G. (2012) “The Voluntary Act Requirement,” in M. Andrei (ed.) Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, New York: Routledge. 182
[1] - Sher, G. (2009) Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness, New York: Oxford University Press.
[1] - Smith, A. (2005) “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115: 237.
[1] - Levy, N. (2014) Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press.1
[1] - Ibid 7
[1] - Ibid 31
[1] - Ibid 36
[1] - Caruso, G.D. (2012) Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. P 100
[1] - Ibid 131
[1] - Caruso, G.D. (2015a) “Précis of Neil Levy’s Consciousness and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7–8): 7–15. And Caruso, G.D. (2015b) “If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, then People are Less Responsible than We Think,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7–8): 49–60.
[1] - Pereboom, D., and Caruso, G.D. (2017) “Hard-Incompatibilism Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment,and Meaning in Life,” in G.D. Caruso and O. Flanagan (eds.) Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience, New York: Oxford University Press.
[1] - Rosenthal, D. (2005) Consciousness and Mind, New York: Oxford University Press.
[1] - Shepherd, J. (2015) “Consciousness, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility: Taking the Folk Seriously,” Philosophical Psychology 28: 938.
[1] - Libet, B. (1999) “Do We Have Free Will?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8–9): 47–57, reprinted in R. Kane (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
[1] - Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., and Haynes, J.D. (2008) “Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain,” Nature Neuroscience 11: 543–545.
[1] - Mele, A. (2009) Effective Intentions, New York: Oxford University Press.
[1] - Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., and Haynes, J.D. (2008) “Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain,” Nature Neuroscience 11: 543–545.
[1] - Levy, N. (2014) Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. 16
[1] - Ibid 39
[1] - Siddiqui, F., Osuna, E., and Chokroverty, S. (2009) “Writing Emails as Part of Sleepwalking After Increase in Zolpidem,” Sleep Medicine 10: 262–264.
[1] - Levy, N. (2014) Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. 87
[1] - Ibid 88
[1] - Ibid 89
[1] - Ibid 90
[1] - Ibid 94
[1] - Ibid 94
[1] - Ibid 95
[1] - Ibid 132
[1] - سام هاريس، الإرادة الحرة، ترجمة هيبة خطاب، ص 67
[1] - المرجع السابق ص 68
[1] - المرجع السابق ص 69
[1] - سوزان بلاکمور، الوعي مقدمة قصيرة جدا، ترجمة مصطفى محمد فؤاد، الطبعة الأولى، مؤسسة هنداوي للتعليم والثقافة,ص85
[1] - سام هاريس، الإرادة الحرة ص 70
[1] - المرجع السابق ص 71
[1] - S. J. Blackmore, (2003) Consciousness: An Introduction (London:Hodder & Stoughton; New York:Oxford University Press,p. 66
[1] - B. Libet, (1985)‘Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:529–39
[1] - سام هاريس، الإرادة الحرة ص 74
[1] - سوزان بلاکمور، الوعي مقدمة قصيرة جدًّا، ترجمة مصطفى محمد فؤاد, ص 90
[1] - Caruso, G.D. (2015b) “If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, then People are Less Responsible than We Think,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7–8): 49–60.
[1] - Searle, J. (2000) “Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10): 9.
[1] - Ibid 10
[1] - Searle, J. (2007) Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language and Political Power, New York: Columbia University Press. 42
[1] - Searle, J. (2000) “Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10): 16
[1] - Hodgson, D. (2005) “A Plain Person’s Free Will,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1): 4.
[1] - Ibid 17
قائمة المصادر والمراجع العربية
1- إدمون هورسل، فکرة الفينومنيولوجيا، ترجمة، د فتحي إنقزو، مرکز التوزيع لدراسات الوحدة العربية
2- توماس بينک، الإرادة الحرة، ترجمة: ياسر حسن، مراجعة: ضياء ورّاد، الطبعة الأولى، مؤسسة هنداوي للتعليم والثقافة,القاهرة، ٢٠١٥م .
3- جودتشاکرمحمود،حريةالارادةوالحتميةفيسلوکالإنسان، بحثمنشورعلىالإنترنت علىالموقع: http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=280211
4- د.حسنعليذ نون، فلسفةالقانون,الطبعةالأولى، مطبعةالعاني، بغداد، ١٩٧٥.
5- رءوفعبيد،فيالتسييروالتخييربينالفلسفةالعامةوفلسفةالقانون، مجلةالعلومالقانونيةوالاقتصادية، العددالثاني، السنةالحاديةعشرة، جامعةعينشمس، مصر،١٩٦٩م.
6- سام هاريس، الإرادة الحرة، ترجمة هيبة خطاب .
7- سوزان بلاکمور، الوعي مقدمة قصيرة جدًّا، ترجمة مصطفى محمد فؤاد، الطبعة الأولى، مؤسسة هنداوي للتعليم والثقافة.
8- صلاح محمود عثمان، المنطق متعدد القيم بين درجات الصدق وحدود المعرفة، منشأه المعارف، الإسکندرية، 2002م.
9- د.عبداللهمحراش، الحريةوالحتمية، دروس الفلسفة, منشورةعلىالإنترنتعلىالموقع :
قائمة المصادر والمراجع الأجنبية
1 - Arplay, N., and T. Schroeder. (1999) “Praise, Blame and the Whole Self,” Philosophical Studies 93: 161–199.
2 - Baumeister, R.F. (2008) “Free Will in Scientific Psychology,” Perspectives of Psychological Science 3: 17
3 - Caruso, G.D. (2012) Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. P 100
4 - Caruso, G.D. (2015a) “Précis of Neil Levy’s Consciousness and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7–8): 7–15.
5 - Caruso, G.D. (2015b) “If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, then People are Less Responsible than We Think,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7–8): 49–60.
6 - Caruso, G.D., and Morris, S.G. (2016) “Compatibilism and Retributive Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance,” Erkenntnis 81:
7 - Feinberg, J. (1970) “Justice and Personal Desert,” in his Doing and Deserving, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
8 - Hodgson, D. (2005) “A Plain Person’s Free Will,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1): 4.
9 - King, M., and Carruthers, P. (2012) “Moral Responsibility and Consciousness,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 9: 200–228.
10 - Levy, N. (2011) Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press.
11 - Levy, N. (2014) Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press.
12 - Libet, B., Gleason, C.A., Wright, E. W., and Pearl, D. K. (1983) “Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act,” Brain 106: 623–642.
13 - Libet, B. (1999) “Do We Have Free Will?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8–9): 47–57, reprinted in R. Kane (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
14 - Libet, B, (1985)‘Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8
15 - Mele, A. (2009) Effective Intentions, New York: Oxford University Press.
16 - Nadelhoffer, T. (2011) “The Threat of Shrinking Agency and Free Will Disillusionism,” in L. Nadel and W. Sinnott-Armstrong eds. Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet, New York: Oxford University Press.
17 - Pereboom, D. (2001) Living Without Free Will, Oxford: Cambridge University Press.
18 - Pereboom, D. (2014) Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19 - Pereboom, D., and Caruso, G.D. (2017) “Hard-Incompatibilism Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment,and Meaning in Life,” in G.D. Caruso and O. Flanagan (eds.) Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience, New York: Oxford University Press
20 - Rosenthal, D. (2005) Consciousness and Mind, New York: Oxford University Press.
21 - Searle, J. (2000) “Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10): 9.
22 - Searle, J. (2007) Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language and Political Power, New York: Columbia University Press.
23 - S. J. Blackmore, (2003) Consciousness: An Introduction (London:Hodder & Stoughton; New York:Oxford University Press.
24 - Shepherd, J. (2015) “Consciousness, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility: Taking the Folk Seriously,” Philosophical Psychology 28: 938.
25 - Sher, G. (2009) Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness, New York: Oxford University Press.
26 - Siddiqui, F., Osuna, E., and Chokroverty, S. (2009) “Writing Emails as Part of Sleepwalking After Increase in Zolpidem,” Sleep Medicine 10: 262–264.
27 - Smith, A. (2005) “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115: 236–271.
28 - Smith, A. (2008) “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment,” Philosophical Studies 138: 367–392.
29 - Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., and Haynes, J.D. (2008) “Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain,” Nature Neuroscience 11: 543–545.
30 - Strawson, G. (1986) Freedom and Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press [revised edition 2010].
31 - Strawson, G. (1994) “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies .
32 - Yaffe, G. (2012) “The Voluntary Act Requirement,” in M. Andrei (ed.) Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, New York: Routledge.
مواقع الإنترنت
https://politics.rice.edu/faculty/george-sher